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Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Coping with aging populations is a challenge for most developed countries. Supporting 
non-working adults can create an unsustainable burden on those working.  One way of 
dealing with this is to raise the normal pension age, but this has proven unpopular. A 
complementary approach is to raise the average labor force participation rate. These 
policies are generally more politically palatable because they often remove barriers, 
allowing people who would like to work to do so. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
To conceptualize and estimate the trade-off between pension age and labor force 
participation rate policies. 
 
METHOD 
We project the populations of European countries and apply different levels of labor 
force participation rates to the projected populations. We introduce the notion of a 
relative burden, which is the ratio of the fraction of the income of people in the labor 
market in 2050 that they transfer to adults out of the labor market to the same fraction 
in 2009. We use this indicator to investigate the trade-offs between changes in normal 
pension ages and the general level of labor force participation rates.  
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RESULTS 
We show that, in most European countries, a difference in policies that results in an 
increase in average labor force participation rates by an additional one to two 
percentage points by 2050 can substitute for a one-year increase in the normal pension 
age. This is important because, in many European countries, without additional 
increases in labor force participation rates, normal pension ages would have to be raised 
well above 68 by 2050 to keep the burden on those working manageable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because of anticipated increases in life expectancy and health at older ages as well as 
because of financial necessity, some mix of increases in pension ages and in labor force 
participation rates will be needed. Pension age changes by themselves will not be 
sufficient. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Most developed countries face a demographic challenge – population aging will reduce 
the portion of the adult population who participate in the labor force, given current age-
specific participation rates (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2008; United Nations 2010).  
Nonworking adults will have their consumption financed significantly by those 
who are working and the burden of these transfers can become unsustainable (European 
Commission 2010; Kotlikof and Burns 2004). This paper is part of a dialog on how best 
to conceptualize and respond to this challenge.  
One way of dealing with this is to think about population aging simply as a public 
pension problem. An obvious solution, then, would be to decrease pension costs, often 
by increasing normal pension ages (OECD 2011). Governments can always save money 
by increasing normal pension ages. But if budgetary considerations are the sole 
rationale for raising the pension age it is unclear why alternative expenditure reductions 
or revenue increases are not equally satisfactory. After all, if education costs rise we do 
not automatically argue that, for the sake of government budgets, the age at which 
students begin primary education should be increased. Thinking about aging solely in 
terms of raising money for public pensions defines the challenge too narrowly. 
Another rationale for raising pension ages is that pensioners are living longer. 
According to this argument, it is unfair for younger generations to have to pay for the 
older generations’ longevity gains, and older generations enjoying those gains should 
help pay for them by retiring later. But retiring later is not the only way for generations 
enjoying longevity gains to help finance their retirement years. Higher labor force 
participation rates during their working ages would also contribute.  
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In this article we argue that addressing the effects of aging is best done in a 
framework that takes both pension age and labor force participation rate policies into 
account. We do this by quantifying the trade-offs between pension ages and labor force 
participation rates in affecting the burden on younger generations of supporting 
nonworking adults as life expectancies increase and populations grow older. The 
political dialogue, however, has not generally recognized that there exists a potential 
trade-off between normal pension ages and labor force participation rates that can be 
translated into policy with good effect.  
We have conceptualized and estimated these trade-offs for the first time for all EU 
countries. We show the mix of pension age policies and labor force participation rate 
policies that would keep the burden on workers of supporting nonworking adults at 
selected levels relative to 2009. As part of this analysis we demonstrate that, in most 
European countries, an increase in normal pension ages to 68 by 2050 would not be 
enough to keep the burden on the working population from ballooning. Policies that 
rely entirely on changes in normal pension ages may require normal pension ages of 70 
or more by 2050 in order to do this. In a world in which normal pension ages could get 
quite high it is especially important to note that policies that increase labor force 
participation rates by an additional one to two percentage points by 2050 can substitute 
for a one year increase in the normal pension age. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
The quantity that underlies our analysis is the average proportion of the income of 
people in the labor force transferred to adults out of the labor force. In year t this can be 
written: 
 
      
   ∑ ∑       
 
    
 
    (            )
   ∑ ∑                 
 
    
 
   
 , (1) 
 
where     is the average proportion of the income of people in the labor force 
transferred to adults out of the labor force in year t (relative transfer),    is the average 
amount received by people out of the labor force in period t from those who are in the 
labor force,   is the highest age at which these amounts are received (100 in our 
computation),        is the population of people at age i and gender j in year t,           is 
the labor force participation rate at age i for people of gender j in year t, and    is the 
average income of people in the labor market in year t. 
There are three important features of this formulation which deserve note here. 
First, the income transferred to those out of the labor market can come from both 
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private and public sources. This concept of the transfer is broader than the fraction of 
labor income taxed to pay for a Pay-As-You-Go pension system, because it includes all 
money transfers to people out of the labor market. Second, the normal pension age does 
not appear explicitly in the equation for the average transfer. It does, however, appear 
implicitly. Countries have different patterns of age- and gender-specific labor force 
participation rates and we allow changes in normal pension ages to have an effect on 
the labor force participation rates of older workers. Third, we do not assume that labor 
force participation rates become zero after the normal pension age, although they are 
typically quite small. We do assume that labor force participation at age 75 and beyond 
is small enough to ignore. 
The average transfer is related to another well-known quantity, the economic 
dependency ratio. There are a number of minor variations in how this ratio is defined, 
but the version most closely related to the average transfer is  
 
 EDRt  
∑ ∑       
 
    
 
    (            )
 ∑ ∑                 
 
    
 
   
, 
 
where EDRt is the economic dependency ratio at time t. 
In our computations we hold 
  
  
 constant. Therefore, 
 
        
      
      
  
       
       
 , (2) 
 
where RB2050 is the relative burden in 2050. It is the ratio of the fraction of the income 
of people in the labor market that they transfer to those out of the labor market in 2050 
to the same fraction in 2009. If the fraction of income transferred to those out of the 
labor market were the same in the two years, the relative burden would be 1.0. 
The population age structures in 2009 are known (Vienna Institute of Demography 
2010), as are the labor force participation rates in that year (Table A1 and its source). 
The age structures of populations in 2050 are derived from the population projections of 
the Vienna Institute of Demography (2010). Therefore, everything in the relative 
burden in equation (2) is known except for the labor force participation rates and the 
normal pension age in 2050.  
In order to investigate the trade-offs between changes in normal pension ages and 
the general level of labor force participation rates, we parameterize hypothetical future 
patterns of labor force participation rates. We determine these possible future patterns 
of labor force participation rates by age and sex in a two-step procedure based on rates 
observed in 2009. In the first step we compute what we call ‘baseline labor force 
participation rates’. Below age 55 the baseline labor force participation rates are those 
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observed in 2009. For age 55 and above the baseline rates are adjusted for possible 
changes in normal retirement ages. Essentially, the procedure is just an age rescaling of 
the participation rates. For example, if the normal pension age were to rise by one year, 
from 65 to 66, then the baseline labor force participation rate of 58 year olds would be 
assigned a value equal to the one observed in 2009 at age 57, one year of age earlier. In 
the second step we take the baseline labor force participation rates (2009 rates adjusted 
for normal pension age changes) and parameterize them as follows: 
 
          * +       (            )   (   )          , (3) 
 
where i is an index for age, j refers to gender and t to the year,           are the baseline 
labor force participation rates, and the maximum in equation (3) for each gender 
separately is taken over all EU countries in 2009, supplemented by Iceland, Norway, 
and Switzerland. These maximum labor force participation rates are shown in Appendix 
Table A1. After these two steps are completed the entire schedule of labor force 
participation rates by age and sex can be specified using only two parameters, the 
normal retirement age and λ. 
Figure 1 shows age- and sex-specific labor force participation rates for Germany, 
Italy, and Spain respectively for three values of λ, 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0, assuming a normal 
pension age of 65. When λ is 0.0 the labor force participation rates are those observed 
in 2009. When λ is 1.0 the labor force participation rates are the maxima observed in 
2009, and when it is 0.5 it is halfway between the 2009 values and the maxima.  
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Figure 1: Hypothetical age- and sex-specific labor force participation rates for 
Germany, Italy, and Spain for three levels of λ, assuming a normal 
pension age of 65 (based on equation (3) above) 
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Figure 1: (Continued) 
 
 
 
For men and women in Germany there are only minor differences between the 
baseline age-specific labor force participation rates and the European maxima through 
age 5559. Much larger differences occur at ages 60+. For Spain the pattern of male 
labor force participation rates is similar to that of Germany, but the participation rates 
for women, particularly older women, are much lower. In Italy men tend to have high 
labor force participation rates, but starting at age 5054 they are considerably lower 
than for Spain or Germany. Italy stands out as having relatively low rates of 
participation for women at all ages and particularly at older ones. In general, the groups 
where labor force participation rates can increase significantly are men and women 
above the age of 50. In some countries, such as Italy, there is substantial scope for 
increases in the labor force participation rates of women at all ages. In others, such as 
Germany, there is little scope for increasing labor force participation for either sex, 
except above age 50.  
 
  
Scherbov, Sanderson & Mamolo: Quantifying policy tradeoffs to support aging populations 
586  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Figure 2: Baseline age- and sex-specific labor force participation rates for 
Germany, Italy, and Spain for three normal pension ages, assuming 
λ=0.5 
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Figure 2: (Continued) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows how we model the effects of changing normal pension ages on 
labor force participation rates in the same three countries, when λ is set equal to 0.5. 
Labor force participation rates below age 55 are unaffected. The largest changes in rates 
due to an increase in the normal pension age from 65 to 69 are for men in the age group 
6569. Women also have substantial increases in the participation rates at 6064. For 
both sexes there is some increase in the labor force participation rates of 7074 year-
olds. 
For our current purposes the parameterization of labor force participation rates by 
normal pension age and   has a disadvantage. The same level of   in different countries 
could be associated with different labor force participation rates because of differences 
in the 2009 rates. To provide a measure that is comparable across countries we compute 
truncated average labor force participation rates by taking the unweighted average of 
the age-specific labor force participation rates through age 64: 
 
       * +   
 
  
∑ ∑         * +
  
    
 
    .  (4) 
 
The results would be only slightly different if we had used a standard age structure 
to compute the       * +. We take the average only up to age group 64 so as to keep 
the averages consistent as normal pension ages (all age 65 or over in our examples) are 
changed. 
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3. Results 
In Figure 3 we investigate the trade-off between normal pension age and average labor 
force participation in the United Kingdom. According to current legislation the normal 
pension age in the UK will increase to 68 by 2046, although planned five-year reviews 
of the normal pension age could change this (BBC News 2013; UK Department of 
Work and Pensions 2006). To show the trade-off we specify three different values of 
the relative burden on the left-hand side of equation (2), the same as in 2009 (1.0), a 
10% higher relative burden than in 2009 (1.1), and a 28% higher burden (1.28). A 28% 
increase in the burden is what we forecast would occur in 2050 if the pension age was 
68 and the average labor force participation rate remained at its 2009 level. A 28% 
increase in that burden would certainly be substantial. We plot iso-burden lines at each 
of these three levels of the relative burden to indicate the trade-off between higher labor 
force participation rates and a higher normal pension age. 
Figure 3 shows an array of policy options available to UK policymakers. One 
option is to set the retirement age at 68 and raise the average labor force participation 
rate from its 2009 level of 0.79 to 0.86. This mix would keep the relative burden at its 
2009 level. An alternative policy with the retirement age at 68 would be to increase the 
average labor force participation rate to 0.83 instead of 0.86. In this case the relative 
burden would be 10% higher in 2050 than in 2009. If the UK wanted to keep the 
relative burden at its 2009 level it could increase the normal pension age to 69 and 
increase the average labor force participation rate to 0.84, or keep the normal pension 
age at 65 and raise the average labor force participation rate to 0.88. 
In Appendix Section 2 we present similar trade-off plots for all EU-27 countries, 
showing three iso-burden levels, 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2. In most EU countries, keeping the 
relative burden at its 2009 level in 2050 with a pension age of 68 would require 
increases in the average labor force participation rates. In some countries there are no 
feasible average labor force participation rates which would allow the average burden to 
remain at its 2009 level, even with a normal pension age of 68. 
Spain has recently enacted a pension reform to increase the normal pension age 
from 65 to 67 by 2027. We can see from the Figure for Spain in Appendix Section 2 
that if the relative burden in 2050 is to be less than 20% higher than its 2009 level, an 
even greater increase in the pension age would be necessary. The 20% higher figure 
could be attained with a normal pension age of 69 and an average labor force 
participation rate of 0.88, up from 0.75 in 2009. The difference between the relatively 
accommodating situation of the UK and more difficult situation of Spain is due to their 
different recent demographic histories. Spain had a rapid fertility decline in the 1980s to 
a level considerably below that of the UK. The speed and extent of the Spanish fertility 
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decline relative to that in the UK makes aging there more rapid and causes the support 
of nonworking adults to be much more challenging. 
 
Figure 3: Trade-off between pension age and labor force participation in the 
UK in 2050. The 2009 average labor force participation rate of 0.79 is 
indicated on the graph. Current plans in the UK are for the normal 
pension age (NPA) to be 68 in 2050. At the 2009 average labor 
participation rate of 0.79 and a normal pension age of 68, the relative 
burden would be 28% higher than it was in 2009 
 
 
Italy had a recent demographic history similar to that of Spain but in 2009 had one 
of the lowest average labor force participation rates in the EU, which means that each 
working adult had to support more nonworking adults. A recent pension reform in Italy 
raises the normal pension age to 68 years and 4 months by 2050. In the Figure for Italy 
in the Appendix, Section 2, we can see that with that pension age and an increase in the 
average labor force participation rate from 0.65 in 2009 to 0.74 in 2050, the relative 
burden would increase by 20%. In order for the relative burden in 2050 to remain at its 
2009 level the average labor force participation rate would have to increase to 0.80. 
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We can see from Figure 3 and the figures in Section 2 of the Appendix that the iso-
burden lines are relatively linear. This makes it feasible to make good approximations 
of their slopes. In Figure 4 we show the slopes of the iso-burden lines for the EU 
countries, measured at the level of the relative burden of 1.1. The slope of the iso-
burden contour could not be computed for Spain because that computation would have 
required a normal pension age higher than 69, which is the highest that we used in our 
computations. 
 
Figure 4: Absolute value of the slope of the iso-burden contour lines 
(multiplied by 100) for EU countries when the relative burden is 10% 
higher in 2050 than in 2009 
 
 
The absolute value of the slope is the percentage point increase in the average 
labor force participation rate that keeps the relative burden constant when the normal 
pension age is reduced by one year. The median value of the absolute values shown in 
Figure 4 is 1.2. This indicates that, in general, it would take around a 1.2 percentage 
point increase in the average labor force participation rate to keep the relative burden 
constant when the normal pension age is reduced by one year. 
Another way to interpret Figure 4 is to see that the inverse of the absolute value of 
the slope is the number of years that the normal pension age could be reduced when the 
average labor force participation rate is increased by one percentage point, so as to keep 
the relative burden constant. The median value of those inverses is 0.84, indicating that, 
keeping the relative burden constant, a one percentage point increase in the average 
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labor force participation rate can compensate for around a 0.84 year decrease in the 
normal pension age. In the Appendix, Section 4, we show that the slopes are rather 
insensitive to whether they are measured using labor force participation rates based on 
2009 or on 2012. 
Average labor force participation rates in the EU in 2009 varied from a low of 0.63 
in Malta to a high of 0.84 in Sweden. In France the average was 0.75 and in the UK it 
was 0.79 or four percentage points higher than in France. An additional increase in the 
French average labor force participation rate of four percentage points by 2050 would 
almost completely substitute for a three-year increase in the normal pension age. Italy 
had a relatively low average labor force participation rate in 2009 of 0.65, ten 
percentage points lower than France. An additional five percentage point increase in the 
average labor force participation rate in Italy in 2050, half the difference to France’s 
level in 2009, would substitute for a three-year increase in the normal pension age. In 
developed countries labor force participation rates in the ages prior to the normal 
pension age differ widely. For example, in 2009 the labor force participation rate 
among 5559 year olds in Denmark was 83.2%, 62.5% in France, while in Malta it was 
48.5% (see Appendix Section 1 for the labor force participation rates of all EU-27 
countries). These differences in labor force participation rates are uncorrelated with 
rates of disability (Sanderson and Scherbov 2010) (see Appendix Section 3), and are 
likely to be influenced by policy differences (Burniaux, Duval, and Jaumotte 2004; 
European Commission 2010). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
Although economic dependency ratios can be found in Economic Policy Committee 
(2005), Toosi (2009), and Whiteford (2006), among others, this is the first detailed 
analysis of the trade-off between normal pension ages and average labor force 
participation rates.  
Increasing the normal pension age is generally unpopular (BBC News 2010; 
Euronews 2010; Guardian 2011). In part this is because increases in the normal pension 
age are seen as a narrowly targeted tax increase. If there is a general problem in the 
country of the central government not having enough money, then it seems unjust that 
people nearing the normal pension age should differentially be asked to bear the burden 
of solving the problem. It seems more just to ask everyone including current pensioners 
to pitch in and share the load. If the current level of pensions is deemed to be too high 
by the central government, then it would also seem appropriate for all generations 
including current pensioners to pay something. It is not clear why someone, say, 65 
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years old should get a public pension in one year, and someone 65 years old but born 
one year later should not get it. 
In some countries increasing the normal pension age also increases the uncertainty 
of income when people have adverse health shocks. Some people are concerned that 
they might not be healthy enough to continue working up to later pension ages. 
Pension age increases also have a disadvantage from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Pension age increases raise the labor force participation rates of people 
close to the end of their working lives. These are ages at which productivity is generally 
declining (Gordo and Mertens 2010; Gordo and Skirbekk 2012; Koolhaas et al. 2012; 
Skirbekk 2004, 2008) and at which it can be difficult to find job openings.  
Pension age increases take decades to implement, as the British example shows. 
Labor force participation policies typically can be implemented much more rapidly, in 
part because they are likely to be more popular and so can contribute to solving the 
fiscal problems associated with aging much sooner. Despite these drawbacks, some 
increases in normal pension age may be desirable. With increasing life expectancies, 
spreading working time more evenly over the lifecycle is becoming necessary and 
desirable (Vaupel and Kistowski 2008; Vaupel and Loichinger 2006). To do this and to 
reduce the burden on working adults of supporting those who are not working requires 
changes both in normal pension ages and in labor force participation rates.  
Labor force participation rate policies can be divided into those that primarily 
affect the supply of labor and those that primarily affect the demand for labor. Two 
groups are most frequently targeted by these policies: women and older workers. For 
women, three supply-side policies are particularly relevant. They are more flexible 
working hours, support for families with young children, and equal tax treatment for 
married and single women. Empirical studies have shown that these policies can result 
in an increase in female labor force participation (Del Boca 2002; Euwals 2001; 
Jaumotte 2003; Kornstad and Thoresen 2006; Lefebvre, Merrigan, and Verstraete 2009; 
Smith et al. 2003). The demand-side policy of enforcing anti-sex discrimination laws 
could also help.  
Flexibility in hours of work, working conditions, and wages can provide an 
environment in which older people can continue to work. When wages are rigidly tied 
to seniority, older workers could have their positions terminated when their productivity 
falls. A phased retirement approach could keep them working, perhaps with fewer hours 
and at a lower wage (Hutchens 2003). Education and training programs for older 
workers could also keep them interested in continuing to work and employers interested 
in continuing to hire them (Crépon, Ferracci, and Fougère 2007; Jones et al. 2009; 
Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsh 2008). 
Tax and pension policies also affect the incentives for remaining in the labor force. 
In some countries these policies produce high implicit tax rates on continued work. 
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Evidence shows that removing financial incentives to retire prior to the normal pension 
age and making pension systems more actuarially fair would have a substantial effect 
on the labor force participation rates of older workers (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; 
Börsch-Supan 2000; Duval 2003; Gruber and Wise 1998, 1999, 2004).  
Disability pensions are sometimes abused and become a vehicle to finance early 
retirement. (Euwals, van Vuuren, and Wolthoff 2010; Gruber 2000; Whiteford 2006). 
For the majority of the working population abuses of the disability system are often 
regarded as something negative. Reforming such systems is likely to be politically 
popular. A nuanced approach to disability where partially disabled people are 
encouraged to work up to their potential can also keep people in the labor force (Yin 
2008). Anti-age discrimination policies can also be used.  
While, in the medium-term, policies to increase labor force participation rates can 
reduce the pressure for increases in the pension age, there is a limit to the ability to 
increase labor force participation rates. Because of this, and anticipated increases in life 
expectancy and improvements in health, some increases in the normal pension age are 
appropriate in the long-run (Sanderson and Scherbov 2005, 2010), in order to keep 
intergenerational balance. 
While the public widely perceives increases in the normal pension age as a 
negative thing, many labor force participation policies are viewed positively, because 
they eliminate distortions, provide people with more opportunities, and reduce the 
fraudulent use of disability pensions. Because of anticipated increases in life expectancy 
and health at older ages as well as because of financial necessity, some mix of increases 
in pension ages and in labor force participation rates will be needed. The best mix is 
more likely to be found where the trade-offs between the two are clearly articulated. 
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Appendix Section 1: Participation rates in 2009, selected age groups,  
    both sexes 
Table A1: Labor force participation rates by selected age groups and country in 
2009 (%) [lfsa_argan] (Last update: 28-07-2011) 
 
4044 4549 5054 5559 6064 
Austria 90.7 88.5 81.4 61.0 21.4 
Belgium 87.2 84.6 76.7 53.2 19.6 
Bulgaria 88.0 85.8 81.0 68.9 30.4 
Cyprus 88.3 85.0 80.7 68.8 46.2 
Czech Rep. 94.3 93.7 90.3 70.7 27.2 
Denmark 91.5 89.7 88.3 83.2 37.5 
Estonia 91.5 90.7 86.1 78.6 51.7 
Finland 91.0 90.3 87.2 76.8 41.2 
France 90.8 89.7 85.6 62.5 18.1 
Germany 90.4 89.4 85.7 76.5 41.8 
Greece 85.1 81.3 72.6 56.5 32.0 
Hungary 85.2 81.8 75.3 52.1 13.6 
Ireland 79.0 78.7 74.8 63.6 44.4 
Italy 79.6 77.9 72.9 52.5 20.9 
Latvia 90.9 90.2 85.7 79.0 40.0 
Lithuania 88.5 88.0 82.7 72.0 39.8 
Luxembourg 85.6 81.5 76.5 54.9 20.2 
Malta 72.5 64.9 59.9 48.5 13.8 
Netherlands 89.5 88.0 84.2 74.7 38.6 
Poland 87.6 83.5 73.0 45.7 19.1 
Portugal 88.8 87.0 80.2 64.3 42.1 
Romania 83.0 79.4 69.8 53.1 31.6 
Slovakia 92.1 91.1 85.1 61.4 17.3 
Slovenia 91.8 91.4 80.9 49.6 18.8 
Spain 85.5 82.8 75.5 62.8 36.6 
Sweden 92.4 90.7 88.4 84.6 64.0 
UK 86.3 86.4 83.0 74.2 46.8 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). Eurostat [electronic resource]. European Union. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/statistics/search_database 
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Maximum labor force participation rates 
Table A2: Maximum age-specific labor force participation rates: EU-27 
Countries plus Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway, in 2009 
Age LFPR 
20-24 81.9 
25-29 90.2 
30-34 94.2 
35-39 93.3 
40-44 94.3 
45-49 93.7 
50-54 93.1 
55-59 89.6 
60-64 75.5 
65-69 51.7 
70-74 21.9 
 
Source: European Commission (2011). Eurostat [electronic resource]. European Union. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/statistics/search_database 
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Appendix Section 2: Trade-off graphs for EU countries 
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Appendix Section 3: The relationship between age-specific disability 
   rates and labor force participation rates 
Table A3: Relationship between the log of the prevalence of disability (limited 
and severe) and labor force participation rates for men 45 to 64 years 
old, EU-SILC countries, 2009 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) -2.10190 0.20535 -10.235 3.71e-14*** 
Prev. of Disability -0.38890 0.72572 -0.536 0.59428 
Age[50-54] 0.20741 0.07644 2.713 0.00896** 
Age[55-59] 0.93922 0.11267 8.336 3.26e-11*** 
Age[60-64] 1.81400 0.12740 14.239 < 2e-16*** 
Belgium 0.09399 0.15673 0.600 0.55127 
Czech Republic -0.45157 0.15300 -2.952 0.00470** 
Denmark -0.46246 0.15154 -3.052 0.00355** 
Estonia -0.06411 0.14810 -0.433 0.66686 
Finland -0.04496 0.14775 -0.304 0.76207 
France -0.11399 0.15824 -0.720 0.47448 
Germany -0.38981 0.15340 -2.541 0.01401* 
Greece -0.22714 0.15397 -1.475 0.14607 
Hungary 0.45598 0.15049 3.030 0.00378** 
Ireland -0.13354 0.15914 -0.839 0.40516 
Italy -0.07391 0.15960 -0.463 0.64519 
Luxembourg -0.08832 0.16285 -0.542 0.58986 
Netherlands -0.32485 0.15024 -2.162 0.03513* 
Poland 0.34518 0.14884 2.319 0.02428* 
Portugal -0.20911 0.14785 -1.414 0.16312 
Spain -0.21094 0.15359 -1.373 0.17540 
Sweden -0.59779 0.19767 -3.024 0.00384** 
United Kingdom -0.28403 0.15959 -1.780 0.08085. 
 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
Residual standard error: 0.2088 on 53 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.9464,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.9242  
F-statistic: 42.55 on 22 and 53 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16  
Sources: Disability Rates: European Health Expectancy Monitoring Unit (EHEMU) (2009). Data on activity limitation from Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) Survey [electronic resource]. Montpellier: Centre de Recherche de Val d'Aurelle. www. 
ehemu.eu/. Labor Force Participation Rates: European Commission (2011). Eurostat: Activity rates by sex, age groups and 
nationality (%) [lfsa_argan] (Updated: 28-07-2011). European Union. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
statistics/search_database 
Notes:  Age groups and countries are dummy variables. The omitted age group is 45-49 years old. The omitted country is Austria. 
Dependent variable is the age-specific labor force participation rate. The results with respect to the statistical significance of the 
disability rate are the same when the dependent variable is the labor force participation rate instead of the log of the labor force 
participation rate and when we consider females instead of males. 
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Appendix Section 4: Sensitivity of the slopes to the use of 2009-based  
  labor force participation rates 
Table A4: Slopes of iso-burden contours for three levels of the relative burden, 
2009 and 2012 labor force participation rates for Germany, Italy, 
and the UK 
 Relative Burden =1.0 Relative Burden =1.1 Relative Burden =1.2 
Germany    
  2012 LFPR NA -1.23 -1.23 
  2009 LFPR NA -1.20 -1.14 
Italy    
  2012 LFPR -1.30 -1.14 -0.94 
  2009 LFPR -1.22 -1.03 -0.87 
UK    
  2012 LFPR -1.00 -0.85 -0.68 
  2009 LFPR -1.02 -0.87 -0.73 
 
